ABSTRACT The continuous progress of the wireless communication technology provides an intelligent and efficient transportation system through vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETS) to mitigate traffic jams and road fatalities, which improves safety of passengers and traffic flow. Many researchers, vehicle manufacturers, and telecommunication industries are working on VANETS to construct the next generation transport system. In VANETS, vehicles, equipped with wireless devices, exchange the traffic-related information with other vehicles and the fixed road side units (RSUs). The information shared between vehicles and RSUs in VANETS must be secure. For secure communications in VANETS, many cryptographic schemes were proposed in different settings, and most of the schemes are using bilinear pairings over elliptic curves. But the computation of a bilinear pairing is very expensive. Also the verification of signatures/messages sent by vehicles increases the computational workload on RSUs. In order to improve computational efficiency and transmission overhead, in this paper, we present an efficient pairing-free certificateless authentication scheme with batch verification for VANETS. We designed the scheme in pairing-free environment which improves the communication and computational efficiency. The proposed scheme supports batch verification, which significantly reduces the computational workload on RSUs in VANETS. The proposed scheme is proven secure in the random oracle model and meets the security requirements, such as authenticity, integrity, traceability, anonymity, and revocation. We compared our scheme with well-known existing schemes, and the efficiency analysis shows that the proposed scheme is more efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advancements in wireless communication technology lead us to introduce the intelligent transportation system in metropolitan cities to manage the traffic caused by thousands of vehicles. These intelligent transportation systems are built using ''Smart vehicles'', equipped with On Board Units (OBUs) and wireless communication devices. These OBUs have the ability to communicate with other OBUs on the vehicles and with the Road Side Units (RSUs), which are located on the road. With these units, two types of communications are possible: Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) communications where OBUs communicate each other and Vehicle-toInfrastructure (V2I) communication where OBUs communicate with RSUs. These communications are depicted in Fig. 1 . These communications will be monitored by a Trust Authority (TA). The secure and trustful communications plays a crucial role in Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETS). Secure communications in VANETS enhances the traffic management, and mitigates traffic accidents, traffic jam, parking difficulty by providing safety related information (to other vehicles) such as traffic signal violation warning, curve speed warning, pedestrian cross warning, post crash notifications, current position of roads and intersections etc. Hence the information shared in VANETS must be satisfied with several cryptographic security requirements such as authentication, integrity, privacy, non-repudiation, traceability, anonymity, of which authentication and privacy preservation are essential for effective security. If the information shared in VANETS does not meet the cryptographic security standards then adversary may target these communications to various kinds of attacks such as eavesdropping, jamming, interference etc. and destroy the network. Hence, there is a need of cryptographic protection to provide secure communication among vehicles. This attracted the attention of researchers to develop the cryptographic protection of messages among the vehicles [1] - [4] . Digital signature is a cryptographic mechanism which provides the authentication and integrity of messages exchanged in VANETS. Digital signature on each message by OBU, before sending it to other vehicles or RSUs, ensures identity authentication, message integrity, entityauthentication, privacy, non-repudiation in VANETS.
A. RELATED WORK
Many sophisticated security schemes have been proposed in the literature to ensure that all the information exchanged in VANET is authenticated. Some Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) authentication schemes [5] , [6] for VANETS have been proposed. Though digital signature in conventional PKI provides integrity and authentication, the maintenance of certificates for vehicles public keys incurs huge computation and communication overhead. To overcome the difficulties in conventional PKI, many Identity-based (ID-based) authentication schemes have appeared in the literature [7] - [21] . In 2010, J. Sun et al. [7] presented an identity-based security system for user privacy in VANETS. Later, in 2011, C. Zhang et al. [8] proposed an identity based batch verification scheme with group testing for VANETS. Later Lee et al. [9] presented an improved scheme to overcome flaws of Zhang et al. scheme [8] by proving [8] is vulnerable to the replaying attack and does not achieve signature non-repudiation. In 2012, K. A. Shim [10] proposed an ID-based conditional privacy preserving authentication scheme (CPAS) for secure V2I communication in VANETS.
In 2013, S. J. Horng et al. [11] proposed a batch verification authentication scheme in VANET for secure pseudonyms. In 2014, J. Zhang et al. [12] proved that Lee et al. [9] scheme is insecure and presented an improved scheme with same efficiency. In 2015, D. He et al. [13] proposed an efficient identity based CPAS for VANETS.
In 2016, M. Azees et al. [14] presented the state-ofthe-art by reviewing VANET system model, characteristics of VANETS and various security services are discussed for VANETS. This paper summarizes all security attacks and presented related possible counter measures. In 2016, N.W. Lo et al. [15] developed a new ID-based signature scheme using ECC for CPAS. This scheme requires less communication bandwidth to transmit the signed message. In 2016, Y. Liu et al. [16] presented an efficient anonymous authentication protocol based on signature with message recovery to improve the efficiency of the system. In 2016, H. Lu et al. [17] presented a survey on privacy preserving authentication schemes for VANETS. In 2016, Y. Wang et al. [18] proposed an extensible conditional privacy preserving pseudo identity based authentication scheme which satisfy batch verification. Also in this scheme, the pseudo identities and the corresponding private keys are generated by PKG alone. In 2017, S. F. Tzeng et al. [19] proposed an efficient ID-based batch verification scheme for VANETS and pointed some security risks. X. Hu et al. [20] proposed a secure ID-based batch verification scheme without pairings for VANETS by improving S. F. Tzeng et al. scheme [19] . In 2017, J. Cui et al. [21] proposed the SPACF scheme and uses cuckoo filter and binary search method in batch verification phase for efficiency. All these schemes are designed in identitybased frame work. Though this ID-based system eliminates the difficulties in PKI, it suffers from inherent key escrow problem. To overcome the certificate management and key escrow problems, Al-Riyami [22] introduced the Certificateless (CLS) based mechanism in 2003. Advantages of certificateless based setting attracted the researchers to design various cryptographic schemes in this framework. Many CLS signatures have been evolved in literature for various applications [23] - [26] . However, one cannot adopt these signature schemes directly for authentication in VANETS due to various security requirements. To meet the security requirements in VANETS, very few CLS authentication schemes have appeared in literature [27] - [31] . All these schemes are using Aggregation procedure based on pairings. Aggregation is a technique where all the valid signatures can be aggregated by a third party and this aggregated signature can be verified. But sometimes it is required to verify multiple signatures in a single instance rather than aggregating them, for VANETS. Here comes the concept of Batch verification. Batch verification is a process where multiple signatures can be verified at a time instead of verifying them one by one. Now we review the literature on CLS signature schemes for VANETS in detail. In 2014, A. Malip et al. [27] presented a novel certificateless privacy preserving authen-tication announcement protocol for VANETS. In 2015, A. K. Malhi et al. [28] proposed a new efficient certificateless aggregate signature scheme for VANETS and proved its security in random oracle model under the assumption of CDHP is intractable. Also the proposed scheme is computationally more efficient due to its constant pairing operations. In 2015, S. J. Horng et al. [29] proposed a conditional privacy preserving aggregate signature scheme for V2V communication in VANETS. They also mentioned that their scheme supports batch verification. This scheme is based on CLS setting with pairings and is the only scheme for VANETS in CLS setting that supports batch verification. But J. Li et al. [30] presented a cryptanalysis on S. J. Horng et al. scheme [29] by discussing the vulnerabilities of malicious-but-passive KGC attack and presented an improved scheme. Recently, in 2018, P. Kumar et al. [31] proposed CLS and CL-AS schemes designed for VANETS using bilinear pairings. Thus there is a need to design a certificateless authentication scheme for VANETS that supports batch verification process.
B. MOTIVATION
Moreover, all the above CLS signature schemes are designed using bilinear pairings over elliptic curves. The time consuming cryptographic operation is pairing operation and is more expensive than the evaluation of a scalar multiplication in elliptic curve. For example, ECC with 224 bit keys provides the same level of security as RSA with 2048 bit keys. Thus ECC has become popular since it provides higher security with smaller keys in size. This smaller key size improves the computational and communicational efficiency, storage capacity, bandwidth efficiency.
Also, in V2I communications, RSUs need to verify large number of signatures that are generated by OBUs. But verifying these signatures sequentially requires lot of computational cost and time. In VANETS, for every100-300 ms, hundreds of messages will be send to RSUs. To reduce the computational cost and time in verification process, Batch Verification technique is used to verify the signatures simultaneously instead of verifying each signature individually. In these VANET based applications, the capacity of bandwidth and computational resources are limited. The evaluation of pairing operation by RSU requires large computing resources and time. For e.g. the evaluation of one pairing operation is 20 times with that of scalar multiplication. In this regard, to further improve the computational efficiency in VANET based applications, it is required to improve the efficiency by eliminating the pairing operations. This motivated us to design a pairing free certificateless authentication scheme for VANETS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first pairing free certificateless authentication scheme designed for VANETS.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contributions in this paper are as follows.
i) We proposed a CLS based authentication scheme for secure communication in VANETS.
ii) The construction of our CLS authentication scheme does not use any pairing operation over elliptic curves. iii) Our CLS authentication scheme is secure against Forgeability, Traceability, Anonymity and Revocation. iv) Compared with existing related schemes in the literature, our scheme improves the computational efficiency. v) Our scheme uses batch verification technique to verify multiple signatures in a single instance, which significantly mitigates the computational workload on RSUs.
D. STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section II we presented preliminaries, syntax and security model for our scheme. In Section III we presented our CLS authentication scheme for VANETS and security analysis. Section IV presents efficiency analysis of the proposed scheme. Finally we presented the conclusions of this paper in Section V.
II. SYNTAX AND SECURITY MODEL
This section presents some preliminaries related to elliptic curves and ECDLP. This section also presents system architecture, frame work and security requirements of the proposed scheme.
Notations and their meanings which we used throughout this paper are tabulated in Table 1 . 
E(x, y) = 0} ∪ {O} is the additive elliptic curve group where O is the point at infinity [32] .
2) ELLIPTIC CURVE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM (ECDLP)
Given P, Q ∈ G, to find an integer x ∈ Z * q , such that Q = xP. Computation of x from P and Q is computationally hard by any polynomial-time bounded algorithm.
B. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE Our VANET structure consists of four entities: TA, Key Generation Centre (KGC), RSU and OBU. 1) TA: It is completely trusted authority and can never be compromised. It is responsible to register the vehicles and RSUs with itself. TAs and RSUs communicate using a secure Transport Layer Security protocols. Since the vehicles initially registers with TA, TA alone can have the knowledge of the real identities (RID). This real identity can be recovered by TA, from the corresponding pseudo identity. In case of malicious vehicle, the TA will trace the RID from the corresponding pseudo identity and no other party can trace this real identity. 2) KGC: It is a trusted third party, generates partial private keys for vehicles. KGC and TA are always trusted and can never collude with each other. 3) RSU: RSU act as a bridge between TA, KGC and OBUs.
RSU is connected with TA and KGC by wire whereas RSUs are connected with OBUs by wireless channel. Pseudo identity is generated by RSU under whose coverage is the vehicle requesting for the pseudo identity. The pseudo identities are allocated to vehicles each time a new RSU is encountered. To reduce the consumption of network bandwidth due to frequent updation of pseudo identities under each RSU, we assume that RSUs may combine to form the autonomous networks. We assume that autonomous network is comprised of 4 RSUs in scarcely populated area and 2 RSUs in densely populated areas. 4) OBU: On board units are embedded in vehicles, and broadcast the traffic related messages, location identity and driving status etc. This device has its own clock for generating correct time stamp and is able to run on its own battery. For this, all TA, KGC, RSU and OBU have roughly synchronized clocks. OBUs communicate with each other and also with RSUs too. In the following, Fig. 2 explains the steps involved in the proposed authentication scheme for VANETS. C. SCHEME FRAMEWORK Our scheme consists of the following seven algorithms.
1) SystemInitialization : This algorithm is performed
by TA and KGC, by taking the security parameter n ∈ Z + as input. This algorithm generates the master public/secret key pair and publishes the list of public parameters as params. Also TA takes some params, real identity as input and calculates vehicles ticket Token and generates a signature on Token. 2) PartialKeyGen : It is performed by KGC that takes the vehicles Token as input and calculate its partial private key. 3) VehicleKeyGen : Vehicle takes Token generated by TA and partial private key generated by KGC as input to generate vehicles public/secret key pair. 4) PseudoIdentityGen : This algorithm is performed by RSU by taking a vehicles ticket Tokenas input and outputs its pseudo identity. 5) SignatureGeneration : It is performed by each vehicle, takes a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , public/secret key pair, partial private key of the vehicle and its pseudo identity as input and outputs a signature σ . 6) SignatureVerification : The individual verification is performed by each vehicle that takes system parameters params, pseudo identity, message with current time stamp, signature σ as input and outputs true if the signature is valid and false otherwise. 7) BatchVerification : Batch verification is performed by RSU and process is similar to individual verification.
D. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The following are the basic security requirements for secure communications in VANETS.
1) MessageAuthentication :
The message authenticity ensures that the received message is indeed transmitted by a vehicle which is claimed to done so. 2) Integrity : It ensures that the message has not been modified or forged or dropped while it is communicated from the sender to the receiver. VOLUME 6, 2018
3) Non − repudiation : Authenticated vehicles could not deny messages after sending them to other vehicles in VANETS. 4) Traceability : TA alone can identify the real identity of the sender by taking its pseudo identity and can identify the malicious messages that are sent by vehicles. 5) Anonymity : Other vehicles and adversaries in VANET cannot identify the senders' real identity either by analyzing multiple messages sent by the same vehicle or by its pseudo identity. 6) Revocation : TA can terminate the communication when the vehicle is confirmed to be a malicious vehicle. Also TA updates the Revocation list by including the malicious vehicles and sends this list to KGC and RSU.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section we propose an efficient CLS based authentication scheme and its security.
A. PROPOSED SCHEME
As discussed in section II, the proposed scheme consists of the following algorithms. 1) SystemInitialization : TA and KGC set up the system parameters for each RSU and OBU as follows.
• TA generates the system parameters by taking the security parameter n ∈ Z + as input. TA also chooses a group G of prime order q, a generator P of G, and chooses a random s 1 ∈ Z * q as its master secret key and set T Pub = s 1 P as its master public key.
• KGC selects a random s ∈ Z * q as its master secret key and set its master public key as P Pub = sP.
• TA and KGC selects hash functions h, H , H 0 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 : {0, 1} * → Z * q , and publish the system parameters as params.
• The vehicle V i s OBUs are secretly preloaded with his parameters {Token i , Sig(Token i ; s 1 )} by TA, where
, RID i is the vehicles real identity. Note that s 1 is known only to TA and s is known only to KGC. 2) PartialKeyGen : When a vehicle V i requests for partial private key, KGC does as follows.
• KGC will check the revocation list, which is sent by TA through a secure channel, to confirm whether vehicle V i is revoked. If the vehicle has not been revoked, KGC will verify the signature Sig(Token i ; s 1 ) by the public key T Pub of TA. If the signature is valid, then KGC generates a partial private key.
• KGC takes Q i , system parameters, a random num- • RSU selects a random k i ∈ Z * q and uses
• The pseudo identity of a vehicle V i is ID i = (ID 1i , ID 2i , T i ) where T i denotes the corresponding pseudo identity's validity period. This pseudo identity is returned to vehicle V i .
• SignatureGeneration : To ensure authentication and message integrity, each message m i ∈ {0, 1} * must be signed by a vehicle V i . A vehicle V i uses its pseudo identity ID i , secret value SK i , partial private key d i to produce the signature as follows.
• The vehicle chooses y 1i , y 2i ∈ Z * q , a current time stamp t i and computes Y 1i , Y 2i , w i as follows.
The signature on message m i is σ i = (R i , Y 1i , u i , w i ). 5) SignatureVerification : Given a signature σ i on a message m i t i , corresponding vehicles pseudo identity ID i and its public key PK i = (X i , R i ), then any verifier can verify the signature as follows.
and verify whether the following equation holds.
. Otherwise rejects. 6) BatchVerification : RSU runs this algorithm by receiving n distinct signatures
to n with corresponding pseudo identities (ID i ) i=1 to n and verify the signatures in a single instance as follows.
• RSU Chooses (δ i ) i=1 to n ∈ Z * q randomly and verify the equation
If the equation holds, RSU accepts the signatures σ i = (R i , Y 1i , u i , w i )fori = 1 to n.; rejects otherwise. Note: KGC will never collude with TA and RSU. Hence KGC does not have access to the pseudo identity, and it cannot forge the signature by replacing private key.
B. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The correctness of the scheme can be justified as follows.
C. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS OF BATCH VERIFICATION
The correctness of the batch verification can be justified as follows.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the following, we present the security requirements such as authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation of our proposed scheme. These security properties can be achieved through our CLS signature scheme. In the following Theorem 1, we prove the proposed CLS signature scheme is secure against Type I and Type II adversaries.
Theorem 1: In the ROM, the proposed CLS scheme is secure under the ECDLP assumption.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from lemma 1 and lemma 2. Proof: Suppose ADV 1 is a Type I forger against our CLS scheme. We will show how to produce another algorithm ξ which can solve the ECDLP with the help of ADV 1 . Suppose ξ receives a challenge (P, Q = sP). Its goal is to compute s. ξ acts as a challenger and answers the queries posed by ADV 1 as follows. Without loss of generality, ξ takes ID * as target identity of ADV 1 on a message m * i . -Initialization Phase: Algorithm ξ sets P Pub = Q = sP and gives the system parameters params nd master public key to ADV 1 and keeps s secretly. -Queries Phase: ADV 1 performs the following oracles in an adaptive manner and the algorithm ξ will answer to these oracles. To avoid the conflict of simulation, ξ need to maintain the initially empty lists 
Note that (R i , X i , h 1i ) generated in this way satisfies the equa- 
is a valid signature with
-Forgery: Finally, ADV 1 out puts a valid signature tuple
From Forking Lemma [33] , if we replay of ξ with same random tape but different choice of H 3 , H 4 , ADV 1 will generate another three σ 2, 3, 4. By r i , x i , s, r 1i , we now denote discrete logarithms of R i , X i , P Pub , Y 1i respectively, that is
Thus we have four linearly independent equations as follows. Proof: Suppose ADV 2 is a Type II forger against our CLS scheme. We will show how to produce another algorithm ξ which can solve the ECDLP with the interaction of ADV 2 . Suppose ξ receives a challenge (P, Q = αP). Its goal is to compute α.ξ acts as a challenger and answers the queries posed by ADV 2 as follows.
-Initialization Phase: Challenger ξ sets P Pub = sP and produces system parameters params.ξ then sends params and master secret key to ADV 2 . -Queries Phase: ADV 2 performs the following oracles in an adaptive manner and the algorithm ξ will answer to these oracles. To avoid the conflict of simulation, ξ need to maintain initially empty lists 
Queries on oracle H
If such tuple exists in L 1 , then ξ returns l 1i . Otherwise, ξ chooses l 1i at random and inserts to the list L 1 . Finally, ξ sends l 1i to ADV 2 .
If such tuple exists in L 2 , ξ returns l 2i . Otherwise, ξ picks a random l 2i ∈ Z * q and returns l 2i .ξ adds
If such tuple exists in L 4 , then ξ gives l 4i to ADV 2 . Otherwise, ξ picks a random l 4i ∈ Z * q and returns l 4i . Finally, ξ adds
-Create User Oracle (Cuser(ID i )): When ADV 2 makes a query on Cuser(ID i ), ξ will search the list L Cuser for the tuple (ID i , x i , X i ). If such tuple exists in L Cuser , then ξ outputs X i . Otherwise, ξ do the following.
q at random and 
q at random and sets
Note that σ i = (R i , Y 1i , u i , w i ) is a valid signature and satisfies equation (1) -Forgery: Finally ADV 2 outputs ID * i , m * , t * , σ * i as its forgery where 
By r i , α, s, r 1i , we now denote discrete logarithms of R i , X i , P Pub , Y 1i respectively, that is R i = r i P, X i = αP, P Pub = sP, Y 1i = r 1i P. Thus we have three independent equations as follows. w
Here r i , α, r 1i , are unknown to ξ and can solve these values from the above equations and outputs α as the solution of ECDLP. 1) Traceability: In our proposed authentication scheme, the vehicle can't be traced based on its identity as pseudo identities are used for communication among vehicles. Since pseudo identity ID i = (ID 1i , ID 2i , T i ) is a combination of master secret key (s 1 ) of TA and some chosen secret value (β) of TA, and hence only the one who knows these values can compute real identity RID i .
Hence it does not leak any information about real identity RID i . If a signature is in dispute, TA can trace the real identity as follows.
2) Anonymity: In our proposed authentication scheme, each vehicle's real identity RID i is kept secret and pseudo identity is ID i = (ID 1i , ID 2i , T i ) assigned for communication which provides the privacy and anonymity in vehicular networks. Since the vehicle uses pseudo identity, which contains ID 1i = k i P and
, so the private information of the vehicle can't be traced. Also the pseudo identities that are allocated to vehicles are updated every time when the corresponding vehicle enters in to the region of next RSU. Hence anonymity has been achieved in our scheme. 3) Revocation: In our proposed scheme, TA maintains and updates a list of malicious vehicles and sends the original revocation list to KGC and RSU through a secure channel. Even if a revoked vehicle requests for a partial private key or a pseudo identity, KGC or RSU will never generate them for illegal vehicles.
IV. EFFICIANCY ANALYSIS
This section presents the performances of our CLS authentication scheme in terms of signing cost, verification cost, total computational cost, transmission overhead and security point of view. We compare our scheme with the existing relevant schemes [27] - [31] . We consider the experimental results [34] - [37] satisfying p + 1 = 12qr. The details of these operations and their conversions are presented in Table 2 . Since our scheme is pairing free, it requires only two scalar multiplications for signature generation. For signature verification it requires only five scalar multiplications and three point additions. Thus our scheme needs 2T SM = 58T MM for signature generation and 5T SM + 3T PA = 145.36T MM for signature verification. The computation costs of schemes [27] - [31] are presented in Table 3 .
B. TRANSMISSION OVERHEAD
Now we present the comparison of transmission overhead of the four schemes [28] - [31] . Though all these schemes are established on bilinear pairings, the scheme presented in A. K. Malhi et al. [28] and P. Kumar et al. [31] are established on ECC. To achieve a security level of 80 bits, in pairing as well as in ECC based schemes, we consider various parameters as shown in Table 4 .
We evaluate the transmission overhead by considering signature, pseudo identity, current time stamp, public key and partial private key of the vehicle by excluding the message.
In A.K. Malhi et al scheme [28] , the vehicle sends the signature σ ijk = (U i , V ijk ) ∈ G, pseudo identity (PS j , PS 1j ) ∈ G, public key P i ∈ G, and partial private key pp i ∈ G. The total transmission cost is 6 |G| + Z * q = 2080bits. Similarly, in S. J. Horng et al. scheme [29] , and J. Li et al. scheme [30] , the vehicle sends σ i = (R i , S i ) ∈ G 1 , pseudo identity ID i = (ID 1i , ID 2i , T i ) ∈ G 1 , public key vpk i ∈ G 1 , and partial private key psk i ∈ G 1 . The total transmission cost is 5 |G 1 |+ Z * q +32 = 5312bits. In P. Kumar et al. scheme [31] , the vehicle sends (U i , V ijk ) ∈ G, pseudo identity (PS j , PS 1j ) ∈ G, public key P i ∈ G, and partial private key pp i ∈ G. The total transmission cost is 6 |G| + Z * q = 2080bits. In our proposed scheme, the vehicle sends the signature σ i = (R i , Y 1i , u i , w i ) ∈ G, pseudo identity ID i = (ID 1i , ID 2i , T i ) ∈ G, public key X i ∈ G, and partial private key d i ∈ Z * q . The total transmission cost is 4 |G| + 4 Z * q + 32 = 1952bits. The following Table 5 presents the total transmission overhead of all schemes in terms of sending a single message and n messages.
From Table 3 , we observe that the computation cost of our authentication scheme is 203.36T MM , and is 56.2% less than A. Kaur et al. scheme [28] , 41.6% less than S. J Horng et al. scheme [29] , 53.27% less than J. Li et al. scheme [30] , 64.95% less than A. Malip et al. Scheme [24] and 68.13% less than P. Kumar et al. Scheme [31] . Also comparison of our proposed scheme with the other schemes is presented graphically in Fig. 3 . The graph clearly indicates that our scheme is more efficient than the existing schemes. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 presents the signing and verification delay with respect to number of messages. In Fig. 4 , the proposed scheme and S J. Horng et al. scheme [29] are having almost same signing delay. But S. J. Horng et al. scheme is insecure. Hence, the signing delay of the proposed scheme is smaller than the existing schemes. In Fig. 5, A. Malip et al. [27] and J. Li et al. [30] schemes verification delay is same. Clearly our scheme yields much less verification delay when comparing to other schemes. From Figs. 4 and 5, we can observe that the slope of the proposed scheme is lower than all other schemes. VOLUME 6, 2018 Hence, of all schemes in the literature, the proposed scheme is more efficient in terms of computational complexity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented an efficient certificateless authentication scheme supporting batch verification for VANETS. The proposed scheme is designed without using bilinear pairings over elliptic curves. The proposed scheme is secure against authentication, integrity, privacy, non-repudiation, traceability, anonymity and revocation. Our scheme uses batch verification technique to verify multiple signatures in a single instance, which significantly mitigates the computational workload on RSUs. The efficiency analysis shows that our authentication scheme is computationally more efficient than the well-known existing schemes. Thus, the proposed scheme can be applied in practice.
